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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS.
JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES COMMITTED IN AIRCRAFT WHILE
FLYING OVER THE HIGH SEAS
Department Editor: Allen H. Meyer*
T HE novel case of United States v. Cordova' has for the first time brought
an American court to face a problem which has long been antici-
pated- that of finding jurisdiction for crimes committed in aircraft while
flying over the high seas.
The Cordova case involved a prosecution for assault and battery com-
mitted when the defendant bit the pilot as the latter was trying to break
up a fight between two passengers. The plane was then flying over the
Atlantic Ocean between Puerto Rico and New York. The district court
found that an assault and battery had been committed, but arrested judg-
ment of conviction as no federal jurisdiction to punish the acts could be
found. The court found that assault and battery are only punishable by a
United States court when committed within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States.2 The Act defining the admiralty and
maritime jurisdictions confined itself to crimes "committed upon the high
seas, or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State,
or when committed within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State on board
any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen
thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United
States, or of any State, Territory, or District thereof." (Italics added.) The
court decided that prior decisions 4 and legislative action5 had determined
that an airplane was not a vessel, and held that "upon the high seas" could
not be extended to mean "over the high seas."
When it is realized that this jurisdictional problem has been foreseen
by various commentators since 1902,6 the result of the Cordova case is
somewhat surprising. But in the United States, apparently nothing has been
done in anticipation of such criminal acts. Our state courts are bound by
* Student Editor, Legal Publications Board, Northwestern University School
of Law.
1 89 F. Supp. 298 (E. D. N. Y. 1950), 1950 USAvR "1. Not appealed.
2 18 U.S.C. §455 (1946), now 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(d), 113(e) (Supp. 1949).
There is no problem of venue if there is jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. §3238 (Supp.
1949) states that the place of trial shall be in the district where the accused is
found or first brought.
3 18 U.S.C. §451 (1946), now 18 U.S.C. §7 (Supp. 1949).
4 United States v. Northwest Air Service, Inc., 80 F. 2d 804 (9th Cir. 1935);
United States v. Peoples, 50 F. Supp. 462 (N. D. Cal. 1943); The Crawford Bros.
No. 2, 215 Fed. 269 (W. D. Wash. 1914). Contra: Reinhardt v. Newport Flying
Service Corp., 232 N. Y. 115, 133 N. E. 371 (1921).
5 44 STAT. 572 (1926), 49 U.S.C. §177(a) (1946).
6 In that year Paul Fauchille drafted his original code of air law, in which he
said that crimes committed aboard aerostats wherever they may be are within the
competence of the tribunals of the nation to which the aerostat belongs. Art. 15,
Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International (1902). HAROLD BROWN, AIRCRAFT
AND THE LAW 190 (1933); SPAIGHT, AIRCRAFT IN PEACE AND THE LAW 124(1919); Myers, The Criminal in the Air, 4 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815(1914); Vold, Postwar Aviation and Crime, 35 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 297
(1945).
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the traditional territorial concept of jurisdiction,7 which excludes jurisdic-
tion for crimes committed over the high seas unless they in some way affect
the state.8 While the states have, in many instances, created the fiction of
defining a crime in such a way as to make it a "continuing" offense, and
thereby pulling it within the bounds of the state,9 such legal manipulation
cannot be effective in cases of assault or of murder (where both the fatal
blow and the death occur above the high seas), as the entire crime has
there been completed without the territory of the state.
. As there is no general jurisdiction in the federal courts over common
law crimes, a federal court must look to a specific federal statute defining an
act as criminal and making such act punishable.' 0 In the United States
Criminal Code, Congress has provided that certain crimes are punishable
when committed "within the Special Maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States," as defined in 18 U.S.C. §7.11 That jurisdiction ap-
plies to offenses committed on the high seas or on an American vessel.
7 State v. Parrish, 242 Ala. 7, 5 So. 2d 828 (1941) ; State v. Stephens, 118 Me.
237, 107 Atl. 296 (1919) ; State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 19 S. E. 602 (1894). See
also Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30 MICH. L. REV.
238 (1931), and Levitt, Jurisdiction over Crimes, 16 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
316 (1925) at p. 331.
8 Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941) (State statute forbidding use of
diving equipment for taking commercial sponges from Gulf of Mexico held valid
and applicable to defendant, a citizen of Florida, who violated it two marine
leagues from shore) ; Mortensen v. State, 214 Ark. 528, 217 S. W. 2d 325 (1949)
(false pretenses) ; State ex rel. Geldar v. Kress, - Md. -, 62 A. 2d 568 (1948)
(conspiracy to violate prohibition laws of North Carolina. Purchased liquor in
Maryland and obtained its transportation to North Carolina. Venue of crime in
North Carolina held proper); Lemore v. Comm., 127 Ky. 480, 105 S. W. 930
(1907) (defendant took prospective purchaser of liquor on boat, crossed Missis-
sippi River from dry Kentucky to wet Missouri, made sale, and returned to Ken-
tucky. Held that transaction made on Kentucky shore); People v. Adams, 3
Denio 190 (N. Y. 1846), aff'd 1 N. Y. 173 (1848) (false pretenses). See also
N. Y. PENAL LAW §1930(5) and §1933 (1944). The Lotus, 2 L. of N. Permanent
Court, p. 20, 1928 A.M.C. 1, showed that Turkey undertakes to punish an alien
who injures a Turk outside Turkey, if the alien is so imprudent as later to come
into Turkish Territory; upheld by a divided court, 7-6.
An interesting law in the TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Art. 186
(1925) reads: "Offenses not committed in the State: Prosecutions for offenses
committed wholly or in part without, and made punishable by law within this
State, may be begun and carried on in any county in which the offender is found."
This statute most likely would only be constitutionally applicable to crimes which
in some way affect persons or property within the state. A borderline case for its
application would be one in which a Texas citizen was the victim of a murder
while a passenger on a trans-oceanic flight, and the murderer was subsequently
apprehended in Texas.
9 This is done most often in larceny statutes where it is provided that every
transportation is a new taking and therefore the offender is punishable in every
county through which the goods are brought. Many courts interpret the statute
to be applicable even where the original taking was outside the state. Schultz v.
Lainson, 234 Iowa 606, 13 N. W. 2d 326 (1944); Garcia v. State, 151 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 272, 207 S. W. 2d 624 (1948).
Similarly, conspiracy indictments will lie in any state in which an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy is committed. Brown v. Elliott, 225 U.S. 392
(1912); People v. Murray, 95 N. Y. S. 107 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Cty. 1905).
And in homicide cases, the offender has been punished in the state where the
victim died, even if the fatal blow was inflicted on the high seas. Commonwealth
v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1 (1869); Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320 (1860).
Thus, in many instances, a "continuing" crime committed on board an air-
plane in oceanic flight may be punishable by a state court, depending upon the
wording and interpretation of the statute.
10 United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32 (U.S. 1812).
11 "The term 'special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States,' as used in this title (the value of the word 'special' has been questioned
by some admiralty lawyers), includes: (1) The high seas, any other waters
within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of
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It would be easy to find jurisdiction under that definition if an airplane
were considered a vessel. While the dictionary includes "any of various
types of aircraft" in the definition of the word "vessel,"'1 2 the courts have
consistently held that an airplane is not a vessel.' 8 The term "vessel" is
itself defined in Title 18 of the United States Code,14 but the definition
does not make clear whether an airplane is to be included within its mean-
ing. Section 7 (a) of the Air Commerce Act' 5 specifically states that any
definition of "vessel" found in the navigation and shipping laws of the
United States shall not be construed to apply to airplanes. So it seems
clear that without a new definition of "vessel" enacted by Congress to ap-
ply to Title 18 of the Code, there can be no doubt that an airplane is
not a vessel.
The maritime jurisdiction also includes "the high seas." It is here that
the court in the Cordova case was unwilling to make an extension of its
jurisdiction to the air space above the high seas. When one examines the
history of the term "upon the high seas" as it has appeared in the federal
criminal statutes, there is strong support for the court's interpretation.' 6
The wording of the law seems to have changed but slightly since its orig-
inal enactment in 1790, when air travel was unthought-of. If Congress had
consciously intended to broaden the scope of the maritime jurisdiction when
it made the latest revision of the criminal code in 1948, it is reasonable
that express wording would have been used so as to remove all possible
doubts. It is more likely that this impending problem was not brought to
Congress' attention, for it can hardly be thought that Congress intended
to leave this air space above the high seas open for criminals to operate in
with immunity.
the jurisdiction of any particular state, and any vessel belonging in whole or in
part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by
or under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or
possession thereof, when such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime juris-
diction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State."
These crimes, defined and punished under Title 18 of the United States Code(Supp. 1949) are Arson, §81; Assaults, §113; Maiming, §114; Embezzlement and
theft, §661; Receiving stolen property, §662; False pretenses, §1025; Murder,§1111; Manslaughter, §1112; Rape, §2031; Carnal knowledge of female under 16,
§2032; Robbery and burglary, §2111.
12 WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2837 (2d ed. 1949), definition
no. 3.
13 Cases cited note 4 supra.
14 U.S.C. §9 (Supp. 1949). "The term 'vessel of the United States,' as used
in this title, means a vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or
any citizen thereof, or any corporation created by or under the laws of the United
States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof."
15 44 STAT. 572 (1926), 49 U.S.C. §177(a) (1946).
16 The history of the phrase "upon the high seas," as applied to jurisdiction
over felonies, is as follows:
U.S. CONST. Art. I, §8, cl. 10: Congress shall have power "to define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against
the Law of Nations."
. April 30, 1790. 1 STAT. 113. "That if any person or persons shall commit
upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of
any particular state, murder or robbery,... (he) shall be deemed, taken and ad-
judged to be a pirate and felon,..."
March 3, 1825. 4 STAT. 115. "That, if any person or persons, upon the high
seas, or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, within
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of thejurisdiction of any particular state, shall commit the crime of wilful murder, or
rape .... (he) shall be deemed guilty of felony, .. ."
March 4, 1909. 35 STAT. 1142. "The crimes and offenses defined in this
chapter shall be punished as herein prescribed: First. When committed upon the
high seas, or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, "
June 25, 1948. 62 STAT. 685, 18 U.S.C. §7, as in note 11 supra.
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-But it was not necessary that the court should interpret the wording
to apply only to a single geometrical plane. While the criminal laws of the
United States are generally strictly construed, 17 the Supreme Court at an
early date extended the phrase "upon the high seas," to include "in the sea"' 8
thereby recognizing a three-dimensional effect to the statute. Unfortunately,
the law of the air seems to have bewildered the courts each time a new issue
of this nature has arisen. Most often the Congress has merely had to amend
an existing law which the federal courts were reluctant to apply to air-
planes. 19
There is no doubt that Congress has the constitutional authority to pro-
vide for the punishment of crimes committed in the air over the high seas.
Congress was given power to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies com-
mitted on the high seas."'20 While arguments may be suggested that this
clause does not include the superadjacent airspace because air transporta-
tion was not contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, there is no
doubt that the necessary statute would be within Congress' power to regu-
late foreign commerce. 2
1
It is likewise clear that such a statute would not be contrary to inter-
national law. While no treaties have dealt with this subject, 22 most coM-
17 United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (U.S. 1820). In that case the
master of an American ship lying in the river Tigris in China was charged with
manslaughter committed on board the vessel. The prosecution was laid under the
Act of April 30, 1790, 1 STAT. 112, dealing with manslaughter committed "upon
the high seas," but other places were not mentioned. §113 of the same statute
dealt with murder committed "upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or
bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state." Chief Justice Marshall re-
fused to transfer the broad jurisdictional scope over murder to the crime of man-
slaughter, and to make the latter offense punishable when committed on a river.
18 United States v. Holmes, 5 Wheat. 412, 418 (U.S. 1820). Defendant
knifed the victim and then threw him overboard, as a result of which he drowned.
The court was of the opinion that "it makes no difference whether the offense was
committed on board of a vessel, or in the sea, as by throwing the deceased over-
board and drowning him, or by shooting him when in the sea, though he was not
thrown overboard."
19 For example, the stowaway laws, 18 U.S.C. §2199 (Supp. 1949), as a result
of United States v. Peoples, 50 F. Supp. 462 (N. D. Cal. 1943) ; THE MOTOR VEHI-
CLE THEFT ACT, 18 U.S.C. §2312 (Supp. 1949), as a result of MeBoyle v. United
States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
20 U.S. CONST. Art. I, §8, cl. 10.
21 U.S. CONST. Art. I, §8, cl. 3.
"It has been asserted that Congress has no specific right to make laws for
navigable airspace as it has for navigable waters of the United States inasmuch
as there is no pertinent provision therefor in the federal Constitution. It is
equally true that when that historic document was framed, flying by human be-
ings was beyond the wildest dreams; and it is a reasonable presumption that with
modern air travel conditions to face, its framers would have made adequate provi-
sion therefor." HAROLD BROWN, AIRCRAFT AND THE LAW 190 (1933). •
The constitutional problem might arise in a case where a private pilot, flying
his own plane, took a passenger for a "joy" ride, flew out over the ocean, mur-
dered his companion, and then returned to his landing field in the United States.
Since the flight could hardly be called foreign commerce, and had no effect thereon,
there is serious doubt that the federal law would apply. Perhaps, though, the
state in which he landed would have jurisdiction on the grounds that the act was
"constructively committed" within that state. See note 8 supra.
22 SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT, AIR LAW §586 (1945).
However, the draft Convention Relating to International Air Navigation at
Paris, 1919, Art. 23, 13, provided that "Legal relations between persons on board
an aircraft in flight are governed by the law of the nationality of the aircraft."
Paragraph 4 said that "In case of crime or misdemeanour committed by one per-
son against another on board an aircraft in flight the jurisdiction of the State
flown over applies only in case the crime or misdemeanour is committed against a
national of such state and is followed by a landing during the same journey upon
its territory." SPAIGHT, AIRCRAFT IN PEACE AND THE LAW 142 (1919). Unfortu-
nately, this article was entirely deleted from the final Convention because it was
felt that the territorial sovereignty provisions of Art. 1 would cover all situations.
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mentators have felt that the law of the air in this instance should be the
same as the law of the sea - that the state of the flag of the airship should
have criminal jurisdiction.23 The Seventh Pan American Conference at
Montevideo in 1933 adopted a resolution "To recommend the adoption of
the following principles on the penalty for offenses committed on board
aircraft: *** (2) Any aircraft without the boundaries of any State, on
the high seas, is subject to the legislation and jurisdiction of its flag." 24
Certain national states have followed this principle. In England the Air
Navigation Act of 1920, Section 14, renders amenable to trial any offender,
British, foreign, or stateless, who commits "any offense whatever . .. on
a British aircraft." Germany, 2 5 Italy,26 Poland, 27 and China 2s also have
similar provisions.
Thus it is seen that the only obstacle to finding jurisdiction in the Cor-
dova case was the court's interpretation of the federal statute defining the
area wherein assaults are punishable. Congress could rightfully have pro-
vided the necessary jurisdiction, both under the Constitution and under
international law. It is also clear that the statute could have been construed
so as to find that jurisdiction over crimes committed above the high seas
had been provided for by Congress. The fact remains that the court did not
so construe the law. A special Act of Congress is now required.29 It can
only. be hoped that this amendment will be soon forthcoming.
PAUL GERHARDT*
23 See note 6 8supra.
24 U.S. Conf. Ser., No. 19 at 254 (Dep't State 1933).
25 Law of May 6, 1940, [1940] I REICHSGESETZBLATT 754, says "The German
Criminal Law shall apply to acts committed on a German ship or German aircraft
regardless of the law of the place of commission." (Translated in U.S. War
Dep't Pamphlet No. 31-122, THE STATUTORY CRIMINAL LAW OF GERMANY 9 (1946.)
26 Law of Oct. 19, 1930, [1930] CODICE PENALE, Art. 4, says that the ships
and aircraft of Italy are considered as territory of the state and are subject to
Italian law except as provided by International law.
27 THE POLISH PENAL CODE OF 1932, translated by Lemkin and McDermott
(Duke Univ. Press, 1939), c. I, Art. 3, §1: "The Polish penal law is applicable to
all persons who have committed an offense within the territory of the Polish
State, or on a Polish vessel or aircraft."
28 THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, translated by Ching-Lin
Hsia and Boyer Chu (Shanghai, 1936), c. I, Art. 3: "This Code shall apply to any
offense committed within the territory of the Republic. An offense committed on
board any Chinese vessel or aircraft, though it was lying at the time outside the
territory of the Republic, shall be deemed to be an offense committed within the
territory of the Republic."
29 Arnold W. Knauth, maritime authority whose advice was cited in the in-
stant case, urges an amendment to the Federal Criminal Code to make the federal
criminal laws applicable "in all places subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States beyond and outside the jurisdiction of any particular State and to all
crimes and felonies and misdemeanors committed in or upon any vessel of the
United States and any aircraft of the United States being in waters and harbors
and in air-spaces and on airports in any foreign place, subject to the primary
jurisdiction of the sovereign state in whose air-space or on whose airports such
offenses are committed to take such action at the time and place of such offense as
the authorities of such sovereign state may deem appropriate."
The 73rd Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, held in Washing-
ton, D. C., September 18-22, 1950, adopted the following resolution:
"RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges the revision of the
present statute by the Congress of the United States so that the jurisdiction
relative to crimes committed aboard surface vessels be extended to include
crimes committed aboard aircraft operating over the land and waters over
which the United States can exercise jurisdiction."
* Student, Northwestern University Law School.
